Why the Rwanda Genocide?

The Rwanda Genocide. The Underlying social and economic causes.

The western media has presented a profuse picture of human suffering of the Ruanda 1994 massacre, but reporters and film makers carefully ignored the underlying colonial, social and economic causes. As in other “countries of transition”, ethnic strife and outbreak of civil war are increasingly depicted as something which is almost inevitable and innate to those countries, constituting “painful stage in their evolution from one-party system toward democracy and the free market”. While the brutality of the massacre shocked the world community, the international media failed to mention that the civil war was preceded by the flare-up of a deep-seated economic crisis and deep-seated inter-ethnic tensions. The restructuring of the agricultural system precipitated the population into abject poverty and destitution. This deterioration of the economic environment which immediately followed the collapse of the international coffee market and the imposition of sweeping macro-economic reforms by the brettonwoods institutions exacerbated simmering ethnic tensions and accelerated the process of political collapse. In 1987, the system of quotas established under the international coffee agreement (ICA) started to fall apart. The world prices plummeted and the state coffee stabilization fund which purchased coffee from Rwandan farmers at fixed prices started to accumulate sizeable debts. A lethal blow to Rwanda’s economy came In June 1989 when the ICA reached deadlock as a result of political pressure from Washington on behalf of the large US Coffee traders. After the meeting of coffee producers in Florida, prices plunged in matter of months for more than 50%. For Rwanda and several African countries, the drop in prices wreaked havoc while tremendous amount of wealth was being appropriated in the rich countries.  The conflict between the Hutu and Tutsi was largely the product of the colonial system. From the late 19th century, the early German colonial occupation used the Mwami king of the Nyingiya monarchy installed at Nyanza as a means of establishing its military posts. In 1926, the Belgians initiated administrative reforms which were largely decisive in shaping socio-economic relations. Colonial historiographers were paid and instructed to transcribe and distort Rwanda-Burundi oral history. As a result of historical record falsification, the Mwami monarchy was identify exclusively with the Tutsi aristocratic dynasty. The Hutus were represented as dominated caste. The Belgian colonialists developed a new social class- so called “NEGRES EVOLUES”- recruited from among the Tutsi aristocracy. School system was put in place to educate the sons of the chiefs and to provide the African personnel required by the Belgians. The Tutsi dynastic aristocracy was made responsible for the collection of taxes and the administration of justice. Traditional chiefs were used to requisition force labor and routine beatings and corporal punishments were administered on behalf of colonial masters by the chiefs. This resulted into the installation of fear and distrust and the collapse of communal solidarity. The traditional clients’ relations were transformed to serve the interest of the colonial masters. The objective of the colonizers was to fuel inter-ethnic rivalries as a means of achieving political control as well as preventing the development of solidarity between the two ethnic groups which would inevitably have been directed against the colonial regime. These socio-ethnic divisions and tensions which unfolded in the 20s have left a profound mark on the contemporary Rwandan society.The communal economy was severely undermined as the peasantry was forced to shift out of food agriculture to cash crops for export. Communal lands were transformed into individual plots geared toward cash crop cultivation (CULTURE OBLIGATOIRES). Apostolic missions and vicariates received political mandates to oblique the peasants to integrate the cash crop economy. Since independence in 1962, relationship with the former colonial powers and donors became exceedingly complex. The same objective of pushing one ethnic group against the other (dive and rule) largely prevailed in various military, human right and macro-economic interventions undertaken from the outset of the civil war in 1990. The release of multilateral and bilateral loans since the outbreak of the civil war was made conditional upon implementing a process of “democratization” under the tight surveillance of the donor community. Western aid in support of multiparty democracy was made conditional upon the government reaching an agreement with IMF. After the collapse of the coffee market in 1989, actual political power in Rwanda rested largely, in any event, in the hands of the donors. “Democratization” based on an abstract model of inter-ethnic solidarity envisaged by the ARUSA peace accord was doomed to failure. It is a fact that the brutal impoverishment of the population which resulted both from the war and the IMF reforms precluded a genuine process of democratization. The objective was to meet the conditions of “good governance” (a new term in the donors’ glossary) and oversee the installation of a bogus multiparty coalition government under the trusteeship of Rwandan external creditors. Multipatyism actually fueled the various political factions of the regime. As soon as the peace negotiations entered a stalemate, the World Bank announced that it was interrupting the disbursement under its loan agreement.The colonial-styled export economy based on coffee (LES CULTURES OBLIGATORES) established under the Belgian administration was largely maintained providing Rwandans with more that 80% of its foreign exchange earnings. Rentier class with interest in coffee trade and with close ties to the seat of political power had developed. Coffee was cultivated by approximately 70% of rural households, yet it constituted only a fraction of total monetary income. The economic foundation of the post-independent Rwanda state remained extremely fragile, since a large share of government revenues depended on coffee, with the risk that a collapse in commodity prices would precipitate a crisis in the state’s public finances. The rural economy was the main source of funding for the state.As the debt crisis unfolded, a large share of coffee and tea earnings had been earmarked for debt servicing, putting further pressure on small scale farmers. Export earnings declined by 50% between 1987 and 1991. The demise of state institutions unfolded thereafter. When coffee price plummeted, famine erupted throughout the Rwandan countryside. According to World Bank data, GDP declined from 0.4% in 1981-1986 to -5.5% in the period immediately following the slump of the coffee market (1987-1991). In November 1988, World Bank mission travelled to Rwanda to review its public expenditure program. The mission presented to Rwandan government two policy options: Scenario 1: No change of strategyScenario 2: With change in strategyScenario 2 labeled “with strategy change” was that of macro-economic reforms and “transition to market economy”.After careful economic simulations of likely policy outcomes, the World Bank concluded with some grain of optimism that if Rwanda adopted scenario 2, levels of consumption would increase markedly over 1989- 1993 alongside a recovery of investment and an improved balance of trade. The simulation also pointed added export performance and substantially lower level of external indebtedness. These outcomes depended on the speedy implementation of the usual recipe of trade liberalization and currency devaluation, alongside the lifting of all subsidies to agriculture; the phasing out of the FOND D’ EGALISATION (stabilization fund for coffee producers); the privatization of state enterprises and the dismissal of civil servants. Exactly the opposite results were achieved, exacerbating the plight of the civil war. A plunge of the Rwanda franc contributed to triggering inflation and the collapse of real earnings. A few days after devaluation, sizeable increases in prices of fuel and consumers essentials were announced. Consumer price index increased from 1.0% in 1989 to 19.2% in 1991. The balance of payment situation deteriorated dramatically. Moreover, the outstanding external debt increased by 34% between 1989 and 1992. State administrative apparatus was in disarray and state enterprises were pushed to bankruptcy. Public services collapsed and the health and education services disintegrated under the brunt of IMF-imposed austerity measures. This led to incidence of severe malnutrition and a dramatic increase in recorded malaria cases by 21% due to lack of drugs in public health centers. The imposition of school fees at the primary school level led to a massive decline in school enrollment. The economic crisis reached its climax in 1992 when Rwandan farmers in desperation uprooted some 300,000 coffee trees. Under the terms of IMF-World Bank, government had frozen the farm gate prices of coffee and government was not allowed to transfer state resource to the coffee stabilization fund. In 1992, a second wave of devaluation was ordered by IMF, leading to – at the height of the civil war- further escalation of the prices of fuel and consumer essentials. Coffee production tumbled by another 25% in a single year. Due to over-cropping of coffee trees, there was increasingly less land available to produce food and not easy for the peasants to switch back to food crops. A meager cash income was insufficient to buy food. Increased of farm inputs had caused a massive drop in the production of cassava, beans and sorghum. Worse still, the cooperatives which provided credit to small farmers had also disintegrated. The liberalization of trade and the deregulation of grain markets as recommended by IMF-World-Bank, heavily subsidized cheap food imports and food aids from rich countries were entering Rwanda with the effect of destabilizing local markets. The free market system imposed on Rwanda made both cash and food crops economically unviable. It pushed the entire agricultural system into crisis. The state administrative apparatus due to civil war and as a result of the austerity measures and sinking civil service salaries, inevitably led to exacerbating the climate of generalized insecurity. Total collapse of coffee production and the Rwandex- the mixed enterprises responsible for the processing and export of coffee- had become largely inoperative. The decision to devalue (and the IMF stamp of approval) had already been reached on the 17th of September, prior to the outbreak of hostilities. The “Green Light” had already been granted as of early October at the very moment when the fighting started, millions of dollars of so-called “balance of payment aid” (from multilateral and bilateral services) came pouring into the coffers of the central bank. These funds administered by the central bank had been earmarked (by the donors) for commodity imports, yet appeared likely that a sizeable portion of these “quick disbursing loans” had been diverted by the regime (and its various political factions) toward the acquisition of military hardware (from South Africa, Egypt and eastern Europe). The purchase of Kalashnikov guns, heavy artillery and mortars were undertaken in addition to the bilateral military aid package provided by France (Milan and apila missiles, jet for the president personal use). Since October 1990, the armed forces expanded from 5,000 to 40,000 which required sizeable influx of outside money. The recruits were largely from the ranks of the urban unemployed. Thousands of delinquents and idle youths from a drifting population were also drafted into the civilian militia responsible for the massacre. In all, from the outset of the hostilities (which coincided with the devaluation of the Rwandan currency and the initial “gush of fresh money“ in October 1990), a total of US$260 million has been approved for disbursal (with sizeable bilateral contributions from France, Germany, Belgium, the European union and US).The World Bank would no doubt contend that things would have been worse had scenario 2 not been adopted. This is the so-called “counterfactual argument”. Such reasoning, however, sounds absurd particularly in the case of Rwanda. No sensitivity or concern was expressed as to the likely political and social repercussions of economic shock therapy applied to a country on the brink of civil war. The World Bank team consciously excluded the “non-economic variables” from their simulations. While the international donor community cannot be held directly responsible for the ethnic massacre and the tragic outcome of the civil war, the austerity measures combined with the impact of the IMF-sponsored devaluation contributed to the impoverishment of the Rwandan people at a time of acute political and social crisis. The deliberate manipulation of market forces destroyed economic activity and people’s livelihood, fueled unemployment and created a situation of generalized famine and social despair.